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evacuation had ceased to be academic and had become practical, and in which he once again reviewed the whole situation, recommending, with the concurrence of the Naval Commander-in-Chief and the General Officer Commanding Shanghai Defence Force, the immediate transfer to Tientsin of a Brigade from the Shanghai Defence Force; (b.) Sir Miles Lampson's telegram No. 28 of the 26th May and a telegram from General Duncan of the same date reporting that the Japanese Government were at once despatching one Mixed Brigade to Tsinan-fu;
(c.) The record of a conversation between Mr. Mounsey and the First Secretary of the Japanese Embassy from which it appeared that while the Japanese Government would not commit themselves to any definite assurances beforehand they would probably, when it came to the point, do every- thing possible to avoid an evacuation of Tientsin, provided that they considered the defence of Tientsin practicable.
and agreed-
(a.) That Sir Miles Lampson should be informed that, in the view of His Majesty's Government, there was, on present infor- mation, no necessity to evacuate British subjects or His Majesty's Legation from Peking;
(b.) That General Duncan should be authorised to despatch, on demand by the Colonel Commandant, North China, one Battalion from Shanghai to Tientsin for use at Tientsin or at Peking as might be required;
(c.) That General Duncan should be instructed to proceed to North China to examine the situation at Tientsin and Peking;
(d.) That the Foreign Office and War Office should concert together in sending the necessary instructions to Sir Miles Lampson and General Duncan.
(ii) With regard to "The possible withdrawal of the Indian Mixed Brigade
as a result of the discussion the Secretary of State for War undertook to consider the suggestion of substituting British for Indian units in the Indian Mixed Brigade and to put forward proposals.
11. The conclusions of the Cabinet Cominittee on China referred to in paragraph 10 above, were considered by the Cabinet at a meeting held on the 1st June, when-
(i.) As regards Peking and Tientsin, the Cabinet took note of and approved the action already taken on the conclusions of the Committee on China (see paragraph 10 (1) above).
(ii.) As regards the withdrawal of the Indian Mixed Brigade, "in view of the
clouded situation in China, the Cabinet agreed :-
That none of the troops composing the Indian Mixed Brigade should be withdrawn, and that the transports now detained at Hong Kong should be allowed to leave."
(Cabinet 35 (27), Conclusion 3).
12. At a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee, held on the 31st May, the Memorandum by the Oversea Defence Committee (referred to in paragraph 6 above) regarding the defence of Wei-hai-Wei in the event of a Nationalist advance into the Province of Shantung was considered. It was pointed out that the situation had changed since this matter had been referred to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, in that it had recently been decided that the British Legation was to remain at Peking as long as possible, and that if withdrawal from Peking should become necessary, it should be to Tientsin and not to Wei-hai-Wei. In these circumstances the Chiefs of Staff submitted a report (C.I.D. Paper No. 804-B) expressing "entire agreement with the conclusions arrived at by the Oversea
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Defence Committee," but emphasising "that these should be regarded as academic appreciation of the situation, and that the actual plan of defence and size of the force required to give effect to it must be left to the discretion of the Naval Commander-in-Chief and General Officer Commanding in China.”
13. At a meeting held on the 15th June the First Lord of the Admiralty informed the Cabinet that he had proposals to make for reducing the number of cruisers on the China station.
The Cabinet agreed :-
៥៩
That the Cabinet China Committee should meet
the purpose of considering:-
(i.) The reduction of cruisers in the China station. (ii) The question of Wei-hai-Wei.
(Cabinet 36 (27), Conclusion 1.)
for
14. The Cabinet China Committee met on Thursday, the 16th June, at 6:15 P.M., and in regard to the reference quoted in paragraph 13 (1) above had before them a memorandum by the First Lord of the Admiralty (C.C. (26) 3), stating that at the present time there were 13 Cruisers on the China Station, and containing the following proposals for reductions :—
EC
Permanent Reductions: Withdrawal of two Cruisers (" Enterprise" and Emerald ").
3
Temporary Reductions: Reduction of one Cruiser during September and October, and of two Cruisers and Hermes during November, December, January and February.
In March, one Cruiser and Hermes" will rejoin, leaving one Cruiser less on the China Station than in August 1927. It is hoped that by then it will have been possible to withdraw all ships at present lent to the China Station from the Mediterranean, but should the situation require it, the number of Cruisers could be again brought up to 11 by attaching either Enterprise" or Emerald. This temporary reduction will take place during the low-water season on the Yangtse, when Cruisers can best be spared.
G
It was further stated in the Memorandum that the Commander-in-Chief, China, had been consulted and concurred in the above proposals; and it was explained that so far as the temporary reductions were concerned, the intention was to withdraw only two cruisers and not three, one during September and October, and a second during November, December, January and February.
The Committee approved the Admiralty's proposals both as regards permanent and temporary reductions.
15. With regard to the reference quoted in paragraph 13 (ii) above, the China Committee had before them :--
(i.) The Report by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee (C.I.D. Paper No. 804-B-see paragraph 12 above) on the Defence of Wei-hai-wei, covering a Memorandum by the Oversea Defence Committee (O.D.C. 523-M), the Conclusions of which are summed up in paragraph 12 of the Memorandum as follows:—
(a.) The defence of the northern portion of the Wei-hai-wei
peninsula and of the Island of Liu-Kung-tao is practicable. (b.) For maintenance of order in this portion and defence against
local bandits one battalion should suffice.
(c.) For maintenance of order in this portion and defence against a general anti-foreign rising, supported by a small force of Nationalist troops, a minimum of three battalions and 1 pack battery, assisted by Naval gunfire and a detachment of aircraft, would be needed. The possibility of ships being immobilised by ice must, however, be borne in mind.
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